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Summary 
Tradable White Certificates (TWC) schemes, also labelled Energy-Efficiency 
Certificates schemes, were recently implemented in Great Britain, Italy and France. 
Energy suppliers have to fund a given quantity of energy efficiency measures, or to buy 
so-called "white certificates" from other suppliers who exceed their target. We develop 
a partial equilibrium model to compare TWC schemes to other policy instruments for 
energy efficiency, i.e., energy taxes, subsidies on energy-saving goods and regulations 
fixing a minimum level of energy-efficiency. The model features an endogenous level 
of energy service and we analyse the influence of the substitutability between energy 
and energy-saving goods to produce the energy service, as well as the influence of the 
elasticity of demand for the energy service. We show that if the level of energy service 
consumption is fixed, a TWC scheme is as efficient as an energy tax, but that it is much 
less otherwise because it does not provide the optimal incentive to reduce the 
consumption of energy service. This inefficiency is worsened if energy suppliers' targets 
are fixed rather than proportional to the suppliers' current output. On the other hand, 
compared to taxes, a TWC scheme allows reaching a given level of energy savings with 
a lower increase in the consumers' energy price, which may ease its implementation. 
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Introduction 
Energy efficiency and energy savings, which had somewhat dropped from the political agenda 
following the counter-oil shock of the late 1980's, have recently raised more attention, especially 
due to climate change and security of supply concerns. Meanwhile, the end of state monopolies 
in the electricity and gas sectors has led to design new policy instruments to save energy.  
In particular, energy efficiency certificates, dubbed Tradable White Certificates (TWC), were 
recently implemented in Great Britain (UK Ofgem, 2005; Sykes, 2005), Italy (Pagliano et al., 
2003; Pavan, 2005) and France (Moisan, 2004; Dupuis, 2007). Setting aside various differences 
among these systems, they may be schematically described as follows. Energy suppliers have to 
generate a given quantity of energy savings, or, if they are short of their target, to buy certificates 
from other suppliers. Vice versa, suppliers who have funded more measures than their target are 
allowed to sell such white certificates to those who are short of their target. In general, in order 
to be taken into account, energy savings have to take place in energy consumers' dwellings or 
plants, not in energy suppliers' facilities. In practice, suppliers typically fund energy savings in 
their own customers' dwellings, or contract with retailers who increase their sales of energy-
efficient goods in exchange for a funding from the energy supplier.  
The peer-reviewed literature on TWC schemes is increasing but still scarce. Langniss and 
Praetorius (2006) as well as Mundaca (2007) discuss the transaction costs associated with the 
generation of TWC and their implication for TWC markets, an issue that we do not address here. 
Bertoldi and Huld (2006) discuss some implementation issues as well as the interaction of TWC 
schemes with other trading systems, a question that we do not address either. Vine and Hamrin 
(2008) present the experience to date with TWC schemes and outline potential opportunities in 
the United States. Farinelli et al. (2005), Mundaca (2008) and Oikonomou et al. (2007) quantify 
the potential for a TWC scheme, in Europe for the first two papers and in the Netherlands for the 
latter. To date, an analysis of the economic mechanisms at stake when implementing a TWC 
scheme and of its relative efficiency compared to other policy instruments seems to be lacking. 
In the present paper, we compare two types of TWC schemes to other policy instruments for 
energy efficiency, i.e., taxes, subsidies and regulations. On this purpose, we develop a simple 
partial equilibrium model representing the markets for four commodities: energy, energy-saving 
goods or services, a composite good and TWCs. This paper builds on a working paper by 
Quirion (2006) but enhances it by (i) using more general functional forms (CES instead of Cobb-3 of 29 
 
Douglas) thereby allowing a sensitivity analysis of the elasticities; (ii) allowing for an 
endogenous level of energy service; (iii) assessing another policy instrument (the subsidy). 
Although this simple model cannot by far address all the issues raised when choosing between 
TWC schemes and other policy instruments, it is able to shed a first light on their economic 
efficiency and on their contrasted distributional consequences.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section we present some background information 
on TWC schemes in practice. The first model and the policy instruments are presented in section 
2 and numerical results in section 3. These results are discussed in section 4 and section 5 
concludes. Appendix 1 lists the model's variables and parameters and Appendix 2 provides the 
method used to compare the national targets. 
1. Tradable white certificates in practice 
What is generally called a TWC is the commodity potentially traded between suppliers
1. A TWC 
scheme can then formally be understood as an obligation to save a given quantity of energy 
coupled with a flexibility mechanism, actually the market for TWCs. Although this instrument 
targets potentially every final consumption sector (including industry or transports), it focuses in 
practice on existing buildings (mainly residential but commercial as well), considered as the 
greatest potential for cost-efficient energy savings.  
Although the existing schemes in the UK, Italy and France largely conform to this definition, 
there are some differences among them, for example the obligation to achieve half of the target 
in poor households in the UK.  
In the UK, the first such system, labelled the "Energy Efficiency Commitment" (EEC1), required 
suppliers to save 62 TWh of energy in three years, from 1
st April 2002 to 31 March 2005. This 
target refers to savings cumulated and discounted over the lifetime of the equipments funded, not 
only over the 3-year commitment period. This aggregate goal was exceeded by 40% and the 
suppliers who exceeded their target were allowed to bank these energy efficiency measures for 
the second period (EEC2), running from 1
st April 2005 to 31 March 2008, with a roughly twice 
more ambitious target of 130 TWh. This was indeed the reason for the overachievement of the 
target: as in the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade programme (Ellerman and Montero, 2002), emitters used 
the banking provision to ease the transition between the first and the second (more ambitious) 
                                                 
1 Bertoldi and Rezessy (2006, p. 35) give the following definition: “A white certificate is an instrument issued by an 
authority or an authorised body providing a guarantee that a certain amount of energy savings has been achieved. 
Each certificate is a unique and traceable commodity that carries a property right over a certain amount of additional 
savings and guarantees that the benefit of these savings has not been accounted for elsewhere”. 4 of 29 
 
commitment period. Twelve suppliers groups were set a target under the EEC. Among them, two 
did not meet their target, generating a shortfall of nearly 1 TWh. Since these companies had 
ceased energy trading, no penalty was imposed on them because it would have served no 
practical purpose.  
To tackle "fuel poverty", at least half of the target had to be achieved in the "Priority group", 
defined as those households receiving certain-income related benefits and tax credits. This 
requirement was fulfilled during EEC1. The last available information indicates that one quarter 
before the end of the EEC2, the target had already been overachieved by 26%, including the 
carry-over from EEC1 (UK Ofgem, 2008). Although committed suppliers were allowed to trade 
commitments or energy efficiency activities, such trades occurred neither in the first nor in the 
second period. 
Note that for the third period (2008-2011) the government replaced the EEC by the CERT 
(carbon emission reduction target) with the following characteristics: a target expressed in CO2 
equivalent rather than in energy; a roughly doubled quantitative objective (154 Mt CO2); a larger 
scope including micro-generation and biomass heating; and increased trading opportunities (UK 
Ofgem, 2008).  
In France, the three-year scheme started in July 2006 and the target is 54 TWh, also cumulated 
and discounted over the lifetime of the equipments funded. The latest available data show that 14 
TWh have already been achieved, most of them (95%) in the residential sector. The actor’s 
strategies are still not well described, but we know that some agents have already banked some 
certificates. 
In Italy, the five-year scheme started in 2005, but energy saved by suppliers between 2001 and 
2004 can be accounted to achieve the target until 2009. The 2005 and 2006 targets were 
respectively 0.2 and 0.4 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil-equivalent) increasing each year up to 2.9 
Mtoe in 2009. Contrarily to the two other TWC schemes, these figures refer to annual savings, 
neither cumulated nor discounted. The 2005 and 2006 targets were both largely exceeded and 
240% of the 2006 objective were achieved, including the 2001-2004 savings. In comparison to 
the British scheme, the Italian one has an active market since 24% of the certificates or “titles” 
(equivalent to one toe) delivered have been traded (76% through bilateral transactions and 24% 
on a specific market). Between 2006 and 2007 the part of traded titles has increased from 17 to 
24% and the average market price has decreased (-57% for electricity titles and -11% for gas 
titles).  5 of 29 
 
In Table 1 we compare the targets in the three existing TWC schemes by translating them in a 
standardised unit, which leads to the following results (see Appendix 2 for calculation steps and 
hypotheses). As is apparent from table 1, these targets amount to roughly 1 to 2% of final 
national energy consumption. 
 
Table 1. Targets in the British, Italian and French schemes 
  UK 02-05  UK 05-08  Italy 05-09  France 06-09
Absolute target 
(cumulated & discounted) 
27 TWh/year  43 TWh/year  21 TWh/year  18 TWh/year 
Target in % of final 
energy consumption 
1.4 2.3 1.5 0.9 
 
The savings occur through different measures as indicated in Figure 1, based on reports from the 
public bodies in charge of the TWC schemes (UK Ofgem 2007, AEEG 2007 and DGEMP 
2008). It appears that even though similar measures are addressed in different countries their 
share in the savings differs a lot. For further developments on the existing TWC schemes see the 
above-mentioned references, Bertoldi and Rezessy (2006) or Giraudet (2007). 
 6 of 29 
 














































2.1. The model in business-as-usual (i.e., no energy-saving policy) 
This simple partial equilibrium model features four agents (box 1): energy consumers (who may 
be firms or households) buy energy (labelled e) and energy-saving goods or services (labelled g 
for "green") to generate a certain level of energy service ES (figure 2)
3. ES is "produced" by 
consumers, by combining e and g in a CES function, with an elasticity of substitution  b σ . 
Consumers choose the combination of e and g that minimises their cost subject to the constraint 
that energy service reaches a level ES. 
Consumers also buy a composite good labelled c, which is combined with ES in a CES function, 
with an elasticity of substitution  a σ , to create utility. Consumers choose the combination of ES 
and c that minimises their cost subject to the constraint that utility reaches an exogenous level 
                                                 
2 The model is coded using Scilab and the code is available from the authors upon request. Appendix 1 lists the 
variables and parameters. 
3 Examples of energy services are transportation, light or heat. ES thus represents a certain number of kilometres 
travelled at a certain speed, comfort and reliability, a number of lumens/m², the heating of a dwelling at a certain 
temperature, etc. Examples of goods and services represented by g are thermal insulation panels, energy-saving 
devices that make a fridge-freezer more energy-efficient, and so on. 7 of 29 
 
U . Throughout the paper we take  ab σ σ <  to represent the fact that e and g are closer substitutes 
to one another than to c. 
Figure 2. Consumer demand system 
 
Firms maximise their profit under perfect competition and produce under linearly decreasing 
returns. Our model represents the short term, i.e. the productive capital is fixed, hence the 
assumption of decreasing returns. We assume that public authorities do not intervene in price 
setting, and especially that the energy market is fully liberalised. Without loss of generality, we 
normalise the number of firms and consumers to one in order to simplify the notations, but we 
assume that the real number is large enough for them to be price-takers on all markets. 
 
Box 1. Model equations in business-as-usual 
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where Pu (resp. PES) is the shadow price of program A (resp. B), respectively defined by the 
following equations: 
11 1 aa a a a
ES ES Uc c PP P
σ σσ σ σ αα
−− − =+  (9) 
11 1 bb b b b
ES e e g g PP P
σ σσ σσ αα
−− − =+  (10) 
Suppliers in every sector maximise their profit under perfect competition and produce under 
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The cost incurred by consumers to get a given utility from consumption U  is: 9 of 29 
 
eg cE S cU CC P e P g P c P ES P c P U =⋅ +⋅ +⋅ = ⋅ +⋅ = ⋅ (17) 
And the total cost is 
( ) egc TC CC π ππ =−+ + (18) 
 
2.2. Calibration of the parameters 
Calibration is done in order to represent roughly the French residential sector. In the next two 
sections, we present the results for different values of the elasticities of substitution  , ab σ σ . We 
calibrate the other parameters  { } { } ,, , , , , , , , ji i j cgeE S i cge αγ δ ∈∈  in order to be consistent with 
the following data and assumptions: 
a.  The budget share of residential energy in households' consumption in France is around 4% 
(from Besson, 2008). 
b.  Based on discussion with technical experts, we assume that the budget share of g is half that 
of e. Unfortunately, there is no data on the budget share of energy-saving goods and services 
which are embedded in other goods. For example, there is little data on the supplemental cost 
of an energy-efficient appliance compared to an energy-inefficient one. 
c.  The gross profit ratio (gross operating surplus/value added) of energy producers in France in 
2004 is around 50% (INSEE, 2007). 
d.  The gross profit ratio in France in average in 2004 is around 30% (INSEE, 2007). We 
assume that this ratio applies to firms in the g and c sectors. 
Without loss of generality we set every price (in business-as-usual) equal to one and U = 10. 
From assumptions a and b, for a given value of σa and σb we can then calibrate the  j α . For 
example, setting σa = 0.5 and σb = 1 leads to: αc = 0.8836, αES = 0.0036, αe = 0.666667, αg = 
0.333333. Combining these results with assumptions c and d, we get γe = 0, γg = γc = 0.4, δe = 
2.5,  δg = 3 and  δc = 0.0638298. 
We then numerically solve the eight supply and demand equations (4-8), (12), (14) and (16), 
which provide the four quantities c, e, g and ES.  
To compute the equilibrium with an energy saving policy, we let e exogenous and modify some 
of the above equations as described in sections 2.3 to 2.8 below. We are thus able to compare the 
outcome of these policy instruments for a given level of energy saving. We implicitly assume 10 of 29 
 
that an excessive energy use entails external costs (air pollution, climate change, threats on 
supply security…), justifying an energy-saving policy, but we do not model this part of the issue. 
In other words, we set a cost-efficiency framework, not a cost-benefit one. 
2.3. White certificates with a target as a percentage of energy sold (WC%) 
Under this policy instrument, energy suppliers have to generate a given amount of energy 
efficiency measures, in a quantity w.e proportional to the quantity of energy they sell, e. To fulfil 
this obligation, we assume that they can only subsidise energy-saving goods and services g. For 
each unit of g they subsidise, they get one white certificate. We assume that firms comply with 
this obligation, so the quantity of white certificates equals the aggregate target. Since we model 
only one type of energy- saving goods and services, it is impossible to distinguish business-as-
usual purchase of g from additional energy efficiency measures
4. We thus assume that every sale 
of g is subsidised.  
A new equation appears, the energy-efficiency constraint put by public authorities on energy 
suppliers: 
we g ⋅≤  (19 WC%) 
We assume that this constraint is binding. Otherwise, the price of white certificates would drop 
to zero and the policy would have no effect at all. 
Neither consumers nor suppliers of composite goods are directly affected; hence the first twelve 
equations do not change. Equations (17-18) do not change either. 





ee w e e Max P P w e e e
δ
πγ ⎛⎞ =− − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠


















=+ − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠









=  (16 WC%) 
                                                 
4 In the real world, such a distinction is very costly. Accordingly, the regulator of the UK scheme recognises that 
"the target included business as usual energy efficiency activity" (UK Ofgem, 2005, p. 5). 11 of 29 
 
where Pw is the price of a white certificate. 
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and 
two more variables: PW and w. 
2.4. White certificates with an absolute target (WCA) 
The only difference with WC% is that energy suppliers now have to deliver white certificates in a 
fixed quantity W meaning that each producer's target is defined independently of this producer's 
current and future decisions
5. The target may for instance be proportional to the historical output 
of each producer – but not to its current output, otherwise we are back to WC%.  
We will see in section 3 that this distinction has important consequences. The equilibrium on the 
white certificates market becomes: 
Wg =   (19 WCA) 
where W is the energy producer's target. 
Here again, neither consumers nor suppliers of composite goods are not directly affected, hence 
neither the first twelve equations nor equations (17-18) change. 
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=  (16 WCA) 
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and 
two more variables: PW and W. 
                                                 
5 The existing TWC schemes are somewhat intermediary. In the UK, targets are a function of the number of 
customers, a case which would require a more complex model to be explicitly analysed. In France and Italy, they are 
proportional to energy sales in the last year for which data were available when targets were fixed. An updating is 
likely at the end of the every period (three years in France, five in Italy). 12 of 29 
 
2.5. Tax rebated lump-sum to consumers (TH)
6 
Under this policy instrument, energy produced is taxed at a rate t and receipts from the tax are 
given lump-sum to consumers. A new equation describes the public budget balance: 
te L S ⋅=   (19 TH) 
where LS is the lump-sum subsidy received by the representative consumer. 
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=  (14 TH) 
() egc TC CC LS πππ =−+ +−  (18 TH) 
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and 
two more variables: t and LS. 
2.6. Tax rebated lump-sum to energy suppliers (TE)
8 
The only difference with the previous policy instrument is that the receipts from the tax are now 
rebated (lump-sum) to energy suppliers and not to consumers. Again, a new equation describes 
the public budget balance: 
te L S ⋅=   (19 TE) 
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=  (14 TE) 
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and 
two more variables: t and LS. 
                                                 
6 Since we do not model uncertainty on costs nor market power, this policy instrument is equivalent to a tradable 
permits scheme imposed to energy suppliers, with permits auctioned and receipts transferred to consumers. 
However, in general, tradable permits cover noxious emissions, not energy sold. 
7 Note that under the taxes and the subsidy Pe and Pg are the prices paid by the consumers. 13 of 29 
 
2.7. Subsidy on energy-efficient goods and services 
Under this policy instrument, the production of g is subsidised at a rate s and the cost of the 
subsidy is covered by a lump-sum tax on consumers. A new equation describes the public budget 
balance: 
sg L S ⋅=   (19 S) 
where LS is the lump-sum tax paid by the representative consumer. 
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=  (16 S) 
() egc TC CC LS πππ =−+ ++  (18 S) 
Compared to the initial model, we now have one more equation, one less variable (e), and two 
more variables: s and LS. 
2.8. Energy-efficiency regulation (R) 





≥   (19 R) 
Which we assume binding. This is a classical and straightforward way of modelling energy 
efficiency regulation; cf. Wirl (1989)
9.  





=   (7 R) 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 In our model, this would be equivalent to a tradable permits scheme with permits grandfathered, i.e., distributed for 
free to energy suppliers. 
9 In the transport sector, the US CAFÉ (Corporate average fleet efficiency) regulation for cars and light trucks is 
expressed in this way, ES being a number of miles and e being expressed in gallons of gasoline. Japan has a similar 
(although more ambitious) regulation and in the European Union, such a regulation has been recently proposed by 
the Commission.  
In the building sector, many thermal regulations are also expressed in such a way, ES being a number of m² heated 
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 (8  R) 
Compared to the business-as-usual, we now have one less variable (e), one more variable (r) and 
the same number of equations. 
3. Numerical results  
For each policy instrument, we solve the model for a given level of energy consumption. We 
choose an energy-saving target of 2% compared to business-as-usual, a figure in line with the 
existing TWC schemes (cf. section 1 above). It turns out that the evolution of every variable is 
monotonous with the energy-saving target so contrarily to Quirion (2005) we do not present the 
results for different levels of energy-savings. Instead, we present the results for different values 
of  a σ  and  b σ . More precisely, for every variable we present the results for  0.5 a σ =  and 
different values of  b σ  as well as the results for different values of  a σ  and for  1 b σ ≈
10. The 
choice of  0.5 a σ =  and  1 b σ ≈  as benchmark values is in line with the CGE literature, cf. 
Gerlagh and Kuik (2007, p. 9). 
3.1. Total costs and quantities 
The first row of Figure 3 displays the increase in total cost compared to the business-as-usual 
equilibrium (note that the scale of the y-axis for TC is logarithmic). It turns out that for  0 a σ =  
every policy instrument entails the same overall cost. However as soon as  0 a σ >  the two taxes 
entail the lowest overall cost, followed by WC% and R, whereas WCA and S entail the highest 
cost. The explanation is the following. To reach a given level of energy savings at the lowest 
aggregate cost, it is optimal both to substitute g to e, i.e., to increase energy efficiency, and to 
reduce the level of energy service ES, i.e., to progress towards sufficiency
11. As is apparent from 
the second row of Figure 3, all instruments lead to substitute g for e, but (third row) only the 
taxes lead to a decrease in ES. The other instruments induce an increase in ES, either moderate 
(WC%, R) or significant (WCA, S)
12. In other terms, they generate a rebound effect: a part of the 
                                                 
10 The CES function is not defined for a unitary elasticity of substitution – in this case it tends to a Cobb-Douglas 
function – so we take the closest to one value that was numerically feasible. 
11 On this way of framing the issue, cf. Salomon et al. (2005) and Alcott (2008). 
12 Note that a similar issue arises in the analysis of allocation rules for CO2 allowances: under an output-based 
allocation rule, too much CO2-intensive goods are produced compared to the optimum, while auctioning and lump-15 of 29 
 
increase in energy efficiency (SE/e) is "lost" because of an increase in ES. To compensate for 
this rebound effect, the substitution of g for e has to be higher, especially for WCA and S. The 
lower row of Figure 3 presents the rebound ratio, defined as 
ES ES
ES ES e e
Δ
Δ− Δ
. This ratio 
indicates the share of energy savings that is "lost" because of the increase in ES (if any). As the 
value of  a σ  tends towards that of  b σ , this ratio also tends to 100% with S or WCA whereas it 
only tends to 10% with R or WC%.  
Quantitatively, the difference in total cost across instruments is massive. For example, for the 
benchmark case with  0.5 a σ =  and  1 b σ ≈ , the cost of reaching the energy-savings target is 20 
times higher with WCA and S than with taxes and 9 times more costly than with WCB and R. 
Even with  0.1 a σ =  and  1 b σ ≈ , WCA and S are twice more costly than taxes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
sum allocation lead to the optimal production, at least in a closed economy with perfect competition (Quirion, 
2007). 16 of 29 
 
Figure 3. Impact of a 2% energy-saving target on total cost and on quantities.  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2. Consumers' prices 
As indicated by the first row of figure 4, the evolution of the consumers' energy price is much 
contrasted: it goes down with WCA, S and R; and up with TE, TH and WC%, more sharply with 
taxes than with WC%. These evolutions may be explained as follows. Under all policy 17 of 29 
 
instruments, the decrease in energy consumption makes the energy price go downward, since the 
energy supply curve is upward-slopping. Under WCA, S and R, this is the only influence on 
energy price. However, under both taxes, the energy price rises since suppliers pass the tax on to 
consumers. The same stands under WC%: since suppliers must generate more certificates if they 
increase their production, the certificates' cost is a part of their marginal cost (cf. eq. 14WC% 
above), hence of energy price. However the rise in energy price is lower under WC% than under 
the taxes because under the former, substitution of g for e from two channels: the decrease in Pg 
and the rise in Pe, thus for a given level of energy saving, the evolution of each of these prices 
may be lower than if only one channel was used. 
WC% and WCA have a contrasted impact on Pe: under WCA, since every supplier's target is 
exogenous, the suppliers do not include the certificates' cost in their marginal cost (cf. eq. 14WCA 
above
13). This distinction has important distributional and efficiency consequences. In particular, 
since WCA decreases Pg without raising Pe, PES decreases so ES increases; this rebound effect 
explains why WCA is so costly (cf. section 3.1 above). 
Of course, the higher  b σ , i.e., the more substitutable e and g, the lower the increase in Pe 
necessary to get a given level of energy savings under TE, TH and WC%. Also, the higher  a σ , i.e., 
the more substitutable ES and c, the lower the increase in Pe necessary to get a given level of 
energy savings under TE and TH. Yet the opposite is true for WC%, because the higher  a σ , the 
higher the rebound effect. 
The second row of figure 4 displays the impact on Pg, the consumers' price of g. It rises with R, 
TF and TH because the supply curve is upward-slopping and demand for g rises. Under S, WCA 
and WC%, it goes down since this good is subsidised, but less so under WC% because in this 
case, as we have just seen, a part of the energy savings comes from the increase in Pe. Of course, 
for S, WCA and WC%, the higher  b σ , the lower the decrease in Pg necessary to get a given level 
of energy savings. However, the higher  a σ , the higher the decrease in Pg necessary, because in 
this case the rebound effect is higher. 
The price-index of the energy service PES (not shown here) is a combination of Pe and Pg hence 
it stems from the above-mentioned evolutions. It increases under the two taxes, decreases 
sharply under WCA and S and is slightly reduced under WC% and R. Finally Pc (not shown here) 
                                                 
13 This conclusion stems for our short-term, perfect competition model, but it would not necessarily stand in the 
longer run, especially in a more complex model with imperfect competition, free entry and exit. 18 of 29 
 
is almost unaffected; it increases slightly under the taxes because consumers substitute c for ES 
and the supply curve is upward slopping; and vice-versa for WCA and S. 
 
Figure 4. Impact of a 2% energy-saving target on Pe and Pg.  















































































































































































































































































































































3.3. Distributional consequences 
The upper-left panel of figure 5 displays energy suppliers' profit, which drops in the same 
proportion with all policy instruments except WCA and TE. Under WCA, it decreases much more 
since energy suppliers pay the cost of white certificates while, as already explained, they do not 
pass this cost on to consumers, due to the lump-sum nature of their targets. Note that for a low 
b σ  or a high  a σ , profit can become negative: suppliers still make some money by selling energy 
but this not enough to pay the cost of white certificates
14. Under TE, it rises since the energy 
price increases despite energy suppliers receiving a rebate: since this rebate is lump-sum, it does 
not influence their pricing behaviour, based on marginal cost. Energy suppliers thus benefit from 
a windfall profit under this policy instrument, as they do under the EU ETS (Sijm et al., 2006). 
                                                 
14 In the real world, some firms would most likely exit the market, pushing up the energy price. Alternatively, 
governments may put a cap on the price of white certificates, which they did in France. 19 of 29 
 
The profit of energy-saving goods and service (g) producers' rises with every instrument. The 
increase is identical for  0 a σ ≈ , otherwise it is proportional to the rise in demand for g, i.e., 
higher for WCA and S and lower for the taxes.  
The profit of composite goods (c) producers also evolves proportionally to the demand for c, but 
with much more moderate changes. 
The last row of Figure 5 displays the cost for consumers CC, which is the cost of purchasing the 
goods allowing a utility from consumption U  plus LS with S (since the subsidy is financed by a 
lump-sum tax on households) or minus LS with TH (since the receipts from the tax on energy are 
rebated lump-sum to households). Consumers are net winners under WCA and net losers under 
TE. The impact of these instruments on CC is thus symmetric to their impact on  g π . Consumers 
are pretty much unaffected under WC%, TH and R. So are they with S if  a σ  is low enough and/or 
if  b σ  is high enough, but otherwise the cost to consumers is relatively high. These are also the 
parameters for which S entails the highest total cost; in this case, a very high subsidy rate has to 
be paid, hence consumers have to pay a very high lump-sum tax. 
 
Figure 5. Impact of a 2% energy-saving target on the components of total cost  








































































































































































































4.1. Where to apply which policy instrument?  
We have seen that the relative cost of policy instruments depends crucially on the value of  a σ . If 
this value is close to zero, there is little rebound effect and every instrument entails the same 
overall cost, but if it is high, there is a large rebound and taxes are much more cost-efficient than 
WC% and R and even more so than WCA and S. Many empirical estimates of the rebound effect 
have been published. Greening et al., 2000 performed a review of over 75 estimates and 
conclude that no significant rebound exist for white appliances, and only a limited one for 
residential lighting. The cost penalty (compared to taxes) associated with WC% or R is thus 
probably limited for these applications. On the opposite a larger rebound seems to exist for 
automobile transport, space cooling, space heating and water heating, hence the cost difference 
between taxes and the other policy instruments should be higher. 
4.2. Equity and political acceptability 
Although the taxes entail the lowest aggregate cost, they may be politically more difficult to 
implement economists than other instruments because they lead to a higher (and highly visible) 
increase in energy price. WCA causes a significant drop in energy suppliers' profit so the latter 
are likely to lobby against this instrument.  21 of 29 
 
WC%, R and S have politically the advantage of transferring a part of the cost on the producers 
of the composite good, a heterogeneous group unlikely to engage in the policy process on such 
an issue since energy is not a part of their business and since they are only marginally affected. 
In addition, they increase  g π  significantly (10% at least), so producers of energy-saving goods 
and services may form an influent lobby group in favour of such policies. This may explain why 
regulations and subsidies form the bulk of energy-saving policy instruments in the real world and 
why many countries have launched, or are considering
15, a TWC Scheme. 
4.3. Issues not included in the model  
Equalisation of the marginal cost of energy saving 
TWC schemes, just like taxes and tradable allowances, allow an equalisation of the marginal cost 
of energy savings among energy suppliers under certain conditions. This is the very rationale for 
implementing tradable certificates rather than rigid energy savings targets. On the opposite, rigid 
energy-efficiency regulations do not provide such flexibility. For example, it may be cost 
efficient to keep appliances, light bulbs and dwellings with low energy efficiency where they are 
scarcely used (e.g. incandescent light bulbs in toilets, cheap insulation in second homes…). A 
rigid set of regulation would rule out this possibility. Yet more flexible forms of regulation exist: 
the US CAFÉ regulation does not limit the fuel consumption of every car but of the average of 
the cars sold by each manufacturer. Proposals go around in the US to add flexibility among 
manufacturers, through tradable allowances. To sum up, equalisation of the marginal cost of 
energy saving is an advantage of TWC schemes over rigid regulation, but not necessarily over 
more flexible forms of regulation. 
The "energy-efficiency gap" 
The "energy-efficiency gap" refers to the fact that many opportunities to save energy are not 
implemented by consumers although the decrease in fuel cost would outweigh the cost of the 
energy efficiency investment according to standard cost-benefit analysis
16. This raises some 
doubts on the efficiency of energy taxes: if consumers take little account of energy price in their 
behaviour, raising this price is unlikely to cut energy consumption sharply. On the opposite, 
                                                 
15 According to EuroWhiteCert (2007) Denmark and the Netherlands consider implementing such a system. 
16 In the model we assume that economic agents (in particular energy suppliers and consumers) are perfectly rational 
and that the information provided is perfect. As a consequence, we rule out the energy-efficiency gap, while this gap 
may be seen as one of the main reasons for implementing energy-efficiency policies. Yet various economic 
mechanisms may explain it and no theoretical model can represent all of them. Hence, choosing a model featuring 
one of the economic mechanisms behind the energy-efficiency gap appears certainly desirable, but only as a second 
step, once results from a more canonical model with perfect rationality and information are available. 22 of 29 
 
regulation, if strictly implemented, may be economically efficient by forcing consumers to 
implement energy-efficiency measures that are financially profitable but bypassed in business-
as-usual.  
Would TWC schemes help mobilising the energy-efficiency gap? The answer obviously depends 
on what explains this gap. Many explanations have been put forward (cf. Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994, and Sorrell et al., 2004). We will not restate them here but simply stress that TWC 
schemes may help alleviating some (but not all) of them. Indeed several explanations of the 
energy-efficiency gap point out that some consumers give more importance to investment costs 
than to energy costs, for various reasons: limited access to credit due to asymmetric information 
by lenders on the credit market, split incentives to save energy, e.g., in collective housing or 
commercial centres, rigid separation between investment and operating budget in 
organisations…  
By reducing the cost of energy-efficient capital goods for the consumers, TWC schemes may 
thus help mobilising a part of the energy-efficiency gap more easily than taxes. However this 
intuition should be checked in a formal model featuring some factors which explain the energy-
efficiency gap, including those mentioned above. We leave this for future research. 
Transaction costs  
In the case of TWC schemes, more precisely of the British EEC, Mundaca (2007) identified and 
quantified transaction costs through a questionnaire distributed to energy suppliers and through 
interviews. He found out that transaction costs include search for information, persuasion of 
customers, negotiation with business partners, measurement and verification activities and due 
accreditation of savings. Mundaca estimated that transaction costs represented 8% to 12% of 
investment costs for lighting measures and 24% to 36% for insulation measures. 
These figures are quite significant and most likely higher than transaction costs that could be 
generated with taxes or regulations.  
5. Conclusion 
Although simple and transparent, our partial equilibrium model allows us to compare in a single 
framework tradable white certificate schemes with the main existing policy instruments for 
energy efficiency: energy taxes, subsidies on energy-saving goods and regulations setting a 
minimum level of energy efficiency. We highlight the importance of the rebound effect and 
more generally of the impact of the policy instruments on the consumption of energy service. We 
provide three major conclusions.  23 of 29 
 
First, if a tradable white certificate scheme is to be implemented, a generally neglected but 
important issue is whether the energy-efficiency target imposed to every energy supplier is in 
proportion of the current quantity of energy sold by this firm or whether this target is 
disconnected from the firm’s current decisions. We argue for the former option, which reduces 
the distributive impact of the policy, the rebound effect and the overall cost.  
Second, a tradable white certificate scheme (with targets in proportion of the current quantity of 
energy sold by this firm) entails a higher overall cost than an energy tax but less than a subsidy 
on energy-saving goods. The difference in cost among policy instruments is low for energy 
services with a low elasticity of demand, such as white appliances, but may be high for energy 
services with a higher elasticity of demand, such as automobile transportation, space heating, 
water heating or space cooling. 
Third, a tradable white certificate scheme (with the above precision) may be politically easier to 
implement than an energy tax because it entails little wealth transfers. 
We also discuss informally some mechanisms not included in our models. Firstly, compared to 
rigid standards, a TWC scheme has the advantage of equalising the marginal cost of energy 
saving, but generate more transaction costs. Secondly, compared to taxes, they also generate 
more transaction costs but they are probably more able to address the energy-efficiency gap.  24 of 29 
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Appendix 1. List of variables and parameters 
Variable Domain  Signification  policy 
instrument 
e  > 0  Quantity of energy  All 
g  > 0  Quantity of energy-saving goods and services  " 
c  > 0  Quantity of composite good  " 
ES  > 0  Level of energy service  " 
{ } ,, , , i Pi egcE S ∈   > 0  Price of good i " 
w  0 ≥   Energy savings target for each unit of energy sold  WC% 
W  0 ≥   Energy savings target  WCA 
Pw  0 ≥   Price of tradable white certificates  WC%, WCA 
t  0 ≥   Tax rate  TH,TE 
s  0 ≥   Subsidy rate  S 
LS  0 ≥   Lump-sum tax/subsidy/rebate   TH,TE,S 
r  0 ≥   Minimum ratio of energy efficiency ES/e   R 
 
Parameter Domain  Signification 
{ } ,, , i ie g c α ∈   ] [ 0,1 ∈   Share parameter of good i in consumers' utility 
{ } ,, , i ie g c γ ∈   0 ≥   Intercept of suppliers' marginal production cost curve 
{ } ,, , i ie g c δ ∈   0 ≥   Slope of suppliers' marginal production cost curve 
a σ   0 ≥   Elasticity of substitution in the utility function (upper level) 
b σ   > 0  Elasticity of substitution in the utility function (lower level) 
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Appendix 2. Comparison of national targets 
We compare national targets by formulating them in the same way: in TWh of final energy 
savings, cumulated over the measures lifetime and discounted. This is actually the way the 
British and French targets are formulated (with close discount rates of respectively 3.5% and 
4%). The difficulty is thus to convert into this way the Italian target, originally formulated in ton 
of oil equivalent (toe) of primary energy. 
For that purpose, we interpret the Italian target as follows (Pavan, 2005): 



















incremental savings, year 5
incremental savings, year 4
incremental savings, year 3
incremental savings, year 2
incremental savings, year 1
cumulated savings
 
The undiscounted cumulated savings are the area under the curve, which is equal to five times 
the amount of savings in year 2009 (2.9 Mtoe). Since we use a 4% discount rate, the multiplying 
factor is not 5 but actually 4.63. Since this figure is in primary energy, we multiply it by 0.8
17 to 
convert it in final energy and by 11.63 to convert it in TWh.  
We thus have: 2.9 * 4.63 * 0.8 * 11.63 = 125 TWh. 
We then divide every national absolute target by the scheme’s length and formulate them in 
“annual TWh”. This unit has no physical meaning but allows us to compare the absolute 
constraint levels in a standardised way. Eventually we compare these amounts to the national 
final energy consumption in order to have an idea of the relative constraint of each scheme, 
using the IEA statistics of year 2005. 
                                                 
17 This is approximately the ratio between final consumption (148.07 Mtoe according to IEA) and primary 
consumption (186.8 Mtoe according to Eurostat) in Italy in 2005. 29 of 29 
 




18  130 TWh  125 TWh  54 TWh 
Scheme length  3 years  3 years  5 years  3 years 
Annual constraint  27 TWh/year  43 TWh/year  25 TWh/year  18 TWh/year 
Annual final energy 









Target in % of final 
energy consumption 
1.43% 2.28% 1.45%  0.88% 
 
The results of this standardization exercise must be interpreted carefully since similar measures 
do not generate the same amount of credits in every country. In particular the energy savings 
generated by insulation measures are cumulated over 8 years in Italy, 35 in France and 40 in the 
UK. Hence our comparison probably underestimates the Italian target compared to the others. 
 
                                                 
18 The original figure is 62 TWh with a 6% discount rate; it amounts to 81 TWh with a 3.5% discount rate (Defra, 
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